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Abstract
Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMC) have been
used extensively to model reliability of storage sys-
tems. While the exponentially distributed sojourn time
of Markov models is widely known to be unrealistic (and
it is necessary to consider Weibull-type models for com-
ponents such as disks), recent work has also highlighted
some additional infirmities with the CTMC model, such
as the ability to handle repair times. Due to the memo-
ryless property of these models, any failure or repair of
one component resets the “clock” to zero with any par-
tial repair or aging in some other subsystem forgotten. It
has therefore been argued that simulation is the only ac-
curate technique available for modelling the reliability of
a storage system with multiple components (for eg, see
[1]).
We show how both the above problematic aspects can
be handled when we consider a careful set of approxima-
tions in a detailed model of the system. A detailed model
has many states, and the transitions between them and
the current state captures the “memory” of the various
components. We model a non-exponential distribution
using a sum of exponential distributions, along with the
use of a CTMC solver in a probabilistic model check-
ing tool that has support for reducing large state spaces.
Furthermore, it is possible to get results close to what is
obtained through simulation and at much lower cost.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, Continuous Time Markov Chains
(CTMCs) have been used to model RAID storage
system reliability. For small systems, it is possible
to construct analytic closed-form expressions for both
transient probability of data loss as well as Mean Time
To Data Loss (MTTDL). Given some assumptions about
the system, such as independent exponential probability
distributions for failure and repair, a Markov model can
be constructed, resulting often in a nice, closed-form
expression. A major problem with this model is that
the reliability calculation depends on an extremely
simple view of the storage system, especially time
independence and the use of reliability models based
on exponential probability distributions. Due to the
memoryless property of these models, any failure or
repair of one component resets the “clock” to zero with
any partial repair or aging in some other subsystem
forgotten. Hence, simulation has been argued to be the
only way to model storage reliability. While individual
simulation runs can be fast, simulation for rare events
in reliability studies requires many runs to reduce the
variance of the results (proportional to 1 = √p, p
being the rare event probability) and techniques such as
importance sampling have to be used. However, many of
its techniques are not easy to use and are still a research
topic
In this paper, we show how this problematic aspect
of Markov models can be handled when we consider a
careful set of approximations in a detailed model of the
system. A detailed model has many states, and the tran-
sitions between them and the current state captures the
“memory” of the various components. We show that
with proper approximation of non-exponential distribu-
tions with exponential ones, it is possible to accurately
model storage reliability using Markov models and get
the same results as simulation but much faster. We use a
tool named PRISM where each module is written indep
and the tool does the interleaving of events, so that much
simpler and scalable for programmers/designers (need to
write this sentence properly).
2 Problem with Markov Model: Memory-
lessness
Several questions have been raised[1] regarding suitabil-
ity of Markov models as a tool to measure storage reli-
Figure 1: Traditional m disk fault-tolerant Markov
model. Taken verbatim from [1].
ability. The memorylessness assumption made in these
models may affect reliability analysis of a real system in
case of multi-disk fault tolerant systems. To make the pa-
per self-contained, we consider the same Markov model
for a multi-disk fault tolerant system as in [1] (with Fig-
ures 1, 2 taken verbatim) and summarize the insights in
that paper below.
With every failure, the system (Figure 1) transitions
to a new state but where all the components in the sys-
tem are reset. In other words, the age of a still func-
tioning available component is reset to 0 (i.e., it becomes
new), while any repair of failed components is forgot-
ten. Both cases are problematic. Furthermore, consider
a repair that is represented by the transition from state 1
to state 0. Note that the repair of one disk converts all
disks into their fresh states. However, only the recently
repaired component is new, while all the others have a
nonzero age.
Next, consider the system under repair in an interme-
diate state i with 1 < i < m. On a failure to state i+ 1,
any previous rebuild is lost, and only the variable µ now
decides the repair transition back to state i. The most re-
cent failure therefore determines the repair transition but
it is the earliest failure, whose rebuild is nearest to the
finish, that should decide repair transitions.
With the memorylessness assumption, therefore, each
transition discards any work completed in a previ-
ous state; hence both component wear-out and rebuild
progress are not modelled. Such time-dependent as-
pects are quite difficult to model. Furthermore, accord-
ing to the analysis in [1], there are differing notions of
time: absolute and relative. Absolute time is the time
since the start of the system, whereas relative times apply
to individual device lifetimes and repair clocks. Since
Markov analytic models operate in absolute time, it is
not clear how to handle each individual clock. Accord-
ing to Greenan, simulation is therefore the only effective
solution to this problem because simulation methods can
track relative time and thus can effectively model reli-
ability of a storage system with time-dependent proper-
ties.
Next consider latent sector errors. Any sector error or
bit error during rebuild in critical mode can lead to data
loss; in a m-disk fault tolerant system, the storage system
Figure 2: Multi-disk fault tolerant Markov model with
latent sector errors. Verbatim from [1]. k and m are the
number of data disks and parity disks. h is the BER (bit-
error rate) multiplied by the capacity of the device; i.e.,
the likelihood that a single disk exhibits a bit error if read
in its entirety.
enters critical mode upon the m-th disk failure. The tran-
sition in the Markov model in Figure 2 from the m− 1
to the m+1 state models data loss due to sector errors in
critical mode. However, such a model overestimates the
system unreliability. A sector failure only leads to data
loss if it occurs in the portion of the failed disk that is
critically exposed. For example, in a two-disk fault tol-
erant system, if the first disk to fail is 90% rebuilt when
a second disk fails, only 10% of the disk is critically ex-
posed. This difficulty with Markov models again follows
from the memorylessness assumption.
3 Effectiveness of Markov Models
In this paper, we argue that Markov Models are effec-
tive in spite of the problems mentioned above; how-
ever, this requires using larger state space models. It
has been shown that it is possible to approximate many
common distributions using a sum of many exponential
distributions[2]; it has been computationally difficult in
the past however. Given the maturity of CTMC solvers
available in tools such as PRISM [3] and its focus on re-
ducing the size of state space, the difficulty is no longer
an issue as we show below. To show the effectiveness of
this approach, we first show how the reliability of RAID5
can be computed in much faster time than simulation
where disk failure is modelled by Weibull distributions.
To handle the incorrect assumption of time indepen-
dence with respect to rebuild times, note that a a detailed
model has many states, and the transitions between them
and the current state captures the “memory” of the var-
ious components; this enables us to avoid the time in-
dependence in large measure. We present our results
of modelling rebuild times in Section3.2 and this agrees
with simulation results reasonably closely but at a much
lower cost in terms of time and effort.
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Equation 3
σ =
4µ31−6µ1µ2+µ3±
√
X
Y α =−
2(µ31−3µ1µ2+µ3)
Y
β = 2µ31−µ3∓
√
X
Y
X = −2µ61 + 6µ41 µ2 − 18µ21 µ22 + 18µ32 + 8µ31 µ3 −
12µ1µ2µ3 + µ23
Y = µ41 + 3µ22 − 2µ1µ3
3.1 Case Study 1: Analysis of RAID5 reliability us-
ing 3-state Approximation of Weibull Models
Elerath et al. presented a sequential Monte Carlo simu-
lation method, using Weibull failure models, to calculate
DDF(t) for RAID systems where DDF(t) is the number
of double disk failures in time t. A DDF occurs when
any two disks of a RAID5 group experience operational
failure or one disk has a latent defect followed by op-
erational failure from another disk. As PRISM does not
support anything other than exponential distributions, we
approximate Weibull distributions using phase type dis-
tributions (sum of exponentials). We use the same 3 state
model (burn-in, normal op, failure due to age) of [5] to
approximate each of the Weibull models and find the pa-
rameters of the models α,σ ,β using the standard tech-
nique of moment matching. Here α is the failure rate
during burn-in, σ the rate to working state after burn-in
and β the failure rate after burn-in.
The pdf (probability density function) of the fail state
in the 3-state model is:
1
σ +α−β [β σe
−β t +(α−β )(σ +α)e−(σ+α)t ]
The first three moments of this distribution are :
µ1 =
σ
β +
α−β
α+σ
α−β +σ µ2 =
β 2 +σ(2α +σ)
β 2(α +σ)2 (1)
µ3 =
2
(
1+ −α
3+β 3
(α+σ)3
)
β 3 . (2)
Solving these three equations, we obtain σ , α and β
(eqn. 3).
We use the detailed disk reliability model of Elerath et
al. [4]. Here Time to operational failure (TTOp) (“whole
disk failure”) is modelled with a 2-parameter Weibull
(shape = 1.12, scale = 461386 hrs) whereas Time to latent
defect (TTLd) is modelled as an exponential distribution
(equivalent to a Weibull with shape = 1) with scale =
9259 hours. The Time to restore (TTR) or rebuild time
has a 3-parameter Weibull (shape = 2, scale = 12 hours
and offset 6 hours) while Time to scrub (TTScr) has a
3-parameter Weibull (shape = 3, scale = 168 hours and
offset 6 hours). All of the above Weibull failure/repair
models have increasing failure rates.
We equate the above moments of the 3-state model
with the first three moments of Weibull for each of the
three cases: TTOp, TTScr, TTR. For TTOp, the solutions
turn out to be α = 1.72E− 6 and either σ = 2.49E−
6, β = 2.88E− 6 or, equivalently σ = 1.16E− 6, β =
4.21E− 6
3.1.1 Comparison of Approx. Model with Weibull
To check how well this pdf approximates Weibull dis-
tribution, we compare the pdf functions of approximate
and Weibull models (Figures 3). The hazard rate for the
approximate model becomes constant after some time.
This can be understood by looking into the slope of the
hazard rate function for the approximate model:
σ(β −α)e−(σ+α+β )t
( σσ+α−β e−β t +
α−β
σ+α−β e−(α+σ)t)2
Note that the slope function is a non-negative decreas-
ing function for β > α . Hence after some time slope
becomes zero.
Figure 3: Approximate vs. Weibull pdf; X axis shows time in hrs
To understand the differences better, we look at the
differences between the two CDFs (Approximate minus
Weibull). The difference is never more than +0.006 or
less than -0.003. Therefore, when using the CDFs to
compute probabilities of any interval, the results will
never be erroneous by more than 0.006 - (-0.003) =
0.009, less than 1%. The differences in the right tails
apparently become zero, indicating the approximation to
be very good for right tail probabilities.
For TTR and TTScr, with the same approach, we get
a complex number for σ and β and negative value for
α for each of the two solutions respectively. Hence, we
use other phase type distributions such as Erlang distri-
butions [6]. We use a 3-stage Erlang model. For TTScr
λ = 0.019228232 and for TTR λ = 0.180345653. Using
these models for each type of failure/repair we build a
detailed disk model (Fig.4).
Comparison of PRISM, Monte Carlo Simulation Re-
sults: We compare the reliability of RAID subsystems
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Time(yr) pDDF3(t) pDDF4(t) sDDF(t) sDev3(%) sDev4(%)
1 7.12 5.59 5.63 26.5 -0.72
2 14.37 12.2 12.23 17.5 -0.21
3 21.67 19.26 19.21 12.8 0.28
4 28.99 26.59 26.43 9.7 0.59
5 36.35 34.06 33.8 7.5 0.75
6 43.73 41.6 41.27 6 0.8
7 51.13 49.17 48.79 4.8 0.77
8 58.54 56.73 56.36 3.9 0.66
9 65.96 64.27 63.93 3.2 0.57
10 73.39 71.78 71.50 2.7 0.38
Table 1: DDF(t) per 1000 RAID groups for 6 disk RAID5: PRISM Model (pDDFi(t)) vs. Simulation (sDDF(t)). pDDFi(t)= DDF calculated in PRISM using i-state
disk failure model. sDev = Deviation of PRISM results from Simulation results; Time taken for Model Checking = 37 sec (using 3-state model) and 4.3 min (using
4-state model) while time for Simulation = 8 min; both PRISM and simulation error are 1%. Number of states using symmetry reduction are 8280 and 33985 with
3-state and 4-state model respectively.
Figure 4: Approximate Disk model based on Gopinath et al. [6]: one dif-
ference is that we consider here a more accurate model that has a transition from
Disk(LSE1) state to the Disk(LSE2) state with rate σ rather than a transition from
Disk(LSE1) to Disk(Burnt-in) state.
using PRISM model and Monte Carlo Simulation (Ta-
ble 1 and Table 2). We try to keep the variance of
both PRISM and Monte Carlo Simulation results same
so that we can make a fair comparison. Hence, we set
the termination epsilon parameter in case of PRISM and
the number of experiments parameter in case of Monte
Carlo simulation accordingly. Results from Table 1 (un-
der the column with 3-state disk failure model) show that
DDF(t) values calculated from PRISM model are similar
with those of the Monte Carlo simulation. Due to the
front-overloading of our approximate pdf (compared to
the actual Weibull pdf), the difference between DDF(t)
values calculated using PRISM and Monte Carlo simula-
tion is much higher in the beginning.
It can be noted that the higher deviation between the
results of PRISM and simulation due to front overloading
of the approximate pdf can be reduced by adding more
states in the Markov model. We consider a 4-state model
to check how well it approximates Weibull. Note that a
4-state Markov model has 5 model parameters. To es-
Time(yr) PRISM DDF(t) sDDF(t) sDev(%)
1 2.26 1.92 17.7
2 4.62 3.84 20.3
3 7.03 6.46 8.8
4 9.51 9.32 2
5 12.04 12.16 -1
6 14.63 14.87 -1.6
7 17.27 18.24 -5
8 19.96 21.52 -7.3
9 22.71 24.56 -7.5
10 25.50 28.16 -9.4
Table 2: DDF(t) per 1000000 RAID groups for 8 disk RAID6 : Time taken
for Model Checking = 12.6 min while time for Simulation = 26 hr; PRISM error
is 1% and Simulation Error is 4%
timate them using moment matching is hard; we esti-
mate the parameters by matching the hazard rate curve
of approximate distribution and Weibull distribution for
some time period of interest (0 to 10 yr). Note that the
4-state model does not have an obvious interpretation as
the 3-state does. (we need to reword it. We can say we
tried free tools avlbl but they were not upto it. Instead
of developing another tool, we found it easier to try it by
hand).
Table 1 (under the column 4-state disk model) shows
the DDF(t) values computed using the 4-state model and
how they agree with simulation. Note that in the time
period of t = 0 to 10 yr, the deviations are now much less
(especially in the initial period).
3.2 Case Study 2: Comparison with Greenan’s sim-
ulation results for rebuild
For a single disk fault tolerant system, the difficulties of
modelling rebuild with Markov models does not arise.
In case of multi-disk fault tolerant system (for exam-
ple RAID6), we compose detailed disk models (Fig.4) to
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Figure 5: Comparison of PRISM results with Greenan’s
simulation results. X and Y axis corresponds to failure
shape and the probability of dataloss respectively. (n,k)-
pMDS and (n,k)-gMDS corresponds to the result us-
ing PRISM and Greenan’s simulation result respectively.
The number of states is less than 1000 for PRISM (we
make use of its symmetry reduction capability).
build a disk subsystem model. Hence we consider failure
and repair modes of each disk separately rather than con-
sidering a system level Markov model like Figures 1 and
2. Moreover, when we approximate Weibull repair and
Weibull failure by summation of exponentials (i.e. by
adding multiple states and transitions corresponding to a
single failure/repair transition) then these states keep in-
formation regarding repair progress and age of a compo-
nent respectively. Hence, our disk subsystem models us-
ing detailed disk models reduce the chance of loss of in-
formation due to memorylessness property significantly.
To show that Markov models are effective, we use
PRISM to model some disk subsystem configurations
that use MDS (maximum distance separable) codes from
Greenan’s thesis [7], and compare PRISM results with
the Greenan’s simulation results from a “high-fidelity
simulator” developed only for this purpose. Here, dif-
ferent MDS configurations are analyzed to compute the
sensitivity of probability of data loss in 10 years to failure
shape parameters. We approximate Weibull failure by a
3-state Markov model and Weibull repair by a 8-stage
Erlang model. In both cases we estimate the model pa-
rameters by moment matching. For some cases where the
model parameters (σ and β ) of 3-state Markov model re-
sult in a complex number, we estimate the model param-
eters based on the solution found by moment matching.
Our results (Figure 5) show that PRISM results are sim-
ilar in “order” compared to the simulation results with
the advantage that it is very fast (time taken for calcu-
lating each data point in Figure 5 is less than 1 sec in
PRISM). For some cases with multi-disk fault tolerant
systems PRISM results are higher than the simulation re-
sults. The possible reasons are
• The front overloading of the approximate pdf (in a
3-state model) w.r.t. Weibull pdf.
• Approximating Weibull distribution using Erlang
distribution in case of repair distribution is not good
because Weibull repair has a high shape parameter
(shape=2).
The success of our technique depends on how well
we approximate Weibull distribution using exponentials.
For Weibull distribution with high shape parameter the
approximation becomes poor as the hazard function for
approximate becomes flat for large t whereas for Weibull
it is an increasing function (for example, with Weibull
shape=2, hazard rate increases linearly with time).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that many difficulties due
to the memorylessness of Markov models can be han-
dled if more detailed models are considered. A detailed
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model has many states, and the transitions between them
and the current state captures the “memory” of the var-
ious components. Hence, we can get good agreement
with similar detailed simulated models but at lower cost
in time (for example, for rare event failure case such as
RAID6, PRISM model is almost 150 times faster than
simulation at the same accuracy). We need mature tools
such as PRISM to make such detailed Markov models
feasible. Simulation may still be the best general method
but we also need to consider that validation of the re-
sults in a rare event simulation is non-trivial. We believe
that the automation that is possible in CTMC solvers as
in PRISM (for eg, of interleaving all the failure cases)
makes it much simpler to consider detailed models.
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